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WATER, PROPERTY, AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Janis Snoey
Abstract: In PUD No. I of Pend Oreille County v. Department of Ecology, the Supreme
Court of Washington held that Washington State has authority under the Clean Water Act to
impose a minimum stream flow requirement on a hydroelectric project seeking to amend its
federal license, regardless of whether the flow requirement affects an existing water right. A
water right is property protected by the U.S. Constitution's prohibition on taking without just
compensation. If a state's imposition of a minimum flow requirement under the Clean Water
Act restrains a project from diverting the full quantity of an existing water right, the water
right holder could challenge the state's action as an unconstitutional taking. This Comment
argues that courts should not analyze the constitutionality of the state action under a physical
invasion or exaction analysis. Instead, courts should employ a regulatory taking analysis
because the state is acting in a regulatory capacity and the regulatory takings test allows for
consideration of both the complex interests inherent in a water right and the high degree of
control a state exercises over the right.

Water quantity affects water quality.' The United States Supreme
Court acknowledged this relationship in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County
v. Department of Ecology [hereinafter Elkhorn I] in 1994.2 In Elkhorn H1,
the Court held that a state has authority under the Clean Water Act to
impose a minimum stream flow requirement on a hydroelectric project
seeking a federal license Eight years later, the Supreme Court of
Washington examined the meaning of Elkhorn 11 in Department of
4 [hereinafter
Ecology v. PUD No. 1 of Pend Oreille County
Sullivan
Creek]. Although Elkhorn HI and Sullivan Creek involve rivers on
opposite sides of Washington State, the cases share similar facts. In both
cases, the public utility district proposed a hydroelectric power project
intended to divert water and discharge it far downstream.5 Both projects
imperiled fish as a result of inadequate volumes of water in the bypass
reach,6 the section of river that would be bypassed by the diversion. In
both cases, Washington State, in reviewing the project under the Clean

1. PUD of Jefferson County v. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 719 (1994) [hereinafter Elkhorn
II]. In water law, cases concerning hydroelectric projects are traditionally named for either the body
of water or the dam at issue.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 723.
4. 146 Wash. 2d 778, 51 P.3d 744 (2002) [hereinafter Sullivan Creek].
5. Elkhorn II, 511 U.S. at 708-09; Sullivan Creek, 146 Wash. 2d at 786-87, 51 P.3d at 748-49.
6. Elkhorn 11, 511 U.S. at 709; Sullivan Creek, 146 Wash. 2d at 787, 51 P.3d at 749.
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Water Act (CWA)7 agreed to the project on the condition that the
operator limit its proposed diversion to allow enough water in the bypass
reach to support fish.' What is the difference? The public utilities district
in Elkhorn H had not secured a right to divert water9 while the district in
Sullivan Creek had an existing water right.'" The Sullivan Creek court
held that the CWA does not prohibit the state from requiring the operator
to maintain minimum stream flow, regardless of the effect on the
applicant's existing water right."
If the public utility district in Sullivan Creek builds the power project
as currently designed and meets the minimum flow requirements insisted
upon by the state, the district cannot withdraw the entire year-round
quantity allowed under its water right. 2 Some would see this as a
government attack on a valuable property right. 3 Others would view it as
a reasonable imposition on a user of a public resource.' 4 Both views raise
the issue of whether Washington State can order this without invoking
the Fifth Amendment requirement of government compensation for the
taking of property.
This Comment argues that the determination of whether Washington
State's action is constitutional must be the result of a fact-intensive
regulatory taking analysis in which the holder's loss is balanced against
the state's interest in promoting the general welfare. Part I describes the
authority of a state to impose minimum flow requirements under the
CWA and thereby affect an existing water right. Part II summarizes the
relevant U.S. Supreme Court takings jurisprudence and identifies
particular problems in evaluating diminution of a water right as a Fifth
Amendment taking. Part III argues that if a water right holder challenges
7. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972)(codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2001)).
8. Elkhorn 11, 511 U.S. at 709; Sullivan Creek, 146 Wash. 2d at 787, 51 P.3d at 749.
9. Elkhorn 11, 511 U.S. at 721.
10. Sullivan Creek, 146 Wash. 2d at 784, 51 P.3d at 747.
11. Id.
12. See Petitioner's Opening Brief at 5-17, Sullivan Creek, 146 Wash. 2d 778, 51 P.3d 744
(2002) (No. 70272-8). The briefing for Sullivan Creek does not describe resulting harm to the
proposed project; the author presumes the diminished diversion would reduce the hydraulic head or
power generation capacity. The public utility district did not plead an unconstitutional taking at the
trial court level.
13. See James S. Burling, Protecting Property Rights in Aquatic Resources after Lucas, in
WATER LAW TRENDS, POLICIES AND PRACTICE (Kathleen Marion Carr & James D. Crammond eds.,
1995) [hereinafter WATER LAW TRENDS].
14. See Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights, and the Futureof Water Law, 61 U.
COLO. L. REV. 257, 281-82 (1990).

Water, Property, and the Clean Water Act
this state action as an unconstitutional taking, the court should analyze it
as a regulatory taking. 5
1.

STATES HAVE AUTHORITY UNDER THE CLEAN WATER
ACT TO IMPOSE MINIMUM FLOW REQUIREMENTS

Congress enacted the CWA to control water pollution throughout the
nation, but structured the legislation to encourage state participation.' 6 A
party invokes the CWA by seeking a federal permit for an activity that
results in discharge to the nation's waters. 7 The state becomes involved
because the project proponent must ask the state to certify that the
proposed project meets state water quality standards before a federal
agency can issue the permit." In Elkhorn II, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that a state has authority under the CWA to require minimum stream
flow as a condition to certification. 9 In Sullivan Creek, the Supreme
Court of Washington held that the authority to require minimum stream
flow exists even when an existing water right may be affected.20
A.

The Clean Water Act Applied to Activities in States

The CWA is a water pollution control law intended to restore and
maintain the quality of national water resources.2 ' The CWA's
jurisdiction encompasses "the waters of the United States, including
territorial seas,"" otherwise known as "navigable waters."23 Courts
interpret this to include non-navigable waters, such as wetlands, when
they are associated with the navigable watercourses because the water
quality of navigable waters and non-navigable water are
interdependent.24 The CWA prohibits discharge of toxic wastes,
15. This Comment addresses the right to divert water from surface watercourses, but does not
address groundwater diversion.
16. See infra Part I.A.
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (a)(1) (2000).
18. Id.
19. Elkhorn 11,511 U.S. 700,723 (1994).
20. Sullivan Creek, 146 Wash. 2d 778, 784, 51 P.3d 744, 747 (Wash. 2002).
21. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
22. Id. § 1362(7).
23. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2002).
24. The U.S. Supreme Court considered the CWA's jurisdiction in Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). The Court
confirmed that CWA jurisdiction over non-navigable waters associated with navigable waters is
valid. See id. at 167. However, the Court held the Corps' Migratory Bird Rule (which viewed any
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promotes research and planning, and provides for federal financial
assistance.25
The CWA requires the Environmental Protection Agency to establish
minimum national water quality standards.2 6 States may establish their
own standards, but only if such standards are the same or stricter than
federal standards.27 In addition, the CWA requires "[a]ny applicant for a
federal license or permit to conduct any activity. .. which may result in
any discharge into [] navigable waters" to obtain certification from the
state that the activity will meet the state's water quality standards. 2 This
is known as § 401 certification. 29 No federal agency may issue a license
without state certification or state waiver of certification authority.30
Federal permits requiring § 401 certification cover a wide variety of
projects. They include permits for point source discharges, 3 discharges
of dredged and fill material,32 activities affecting navigation under the
Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 and licenses for hydroelectric projects issued
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). a4 A § 401
requirement to maintain minimum flow would most likely affect
facilities using a water diversion such as a hydroelectric power plant or a
cooling tower for an industrial facility.
A public utility district seeking to build a dam provides an example of
a state's authority in the federal permitting process. First, the district
must seek a license from FERC. 3' FERC requires the district to obtain
§ 401 certification from the state because the water expelled from the

watercourse used by migratory birds to be under CWA jurisdiction) impermissibly extended
jurisdiction to unassociated non-navigable waters. Id. at 174.
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1251. This Comment focuses on the CWA's function in the issuance of federal
permits.
26. Id. § 1313.
27. Id.
28. Id. § 1341(a)(1).
29. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1341 (2001)).
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
31. Debra L. Donahue, The UntappedPower of Clean Water Act Section 401, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q.
201, 219 (citing the OFFICE OF WATER, EPA, WETLANDS AND 401 CERTIFICATIONOPPORTUNITIES AND GUIDELINES FOR STATES AND ELIGIBLE INDIAN TRIBES 10 (Apr. 1989)).

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
16 U.S.C. § 797 (2000).

Water, Property, and the Clean Water Act
dam is a discharge to the nation's waters.36 Second, if dam construction
results in discharge of fill into the water, the district also must seek a
permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). 3 Like FERC,
the Corps will require the district to obtain § 401 certification from the
state.3" If the state finds the project violates state water quality standards
under either the FERC license or the Corps permit, then the state has the
option of refusing to certify the project-in which case the federal
agency would deny the permit-or certifying the project if the applicant
fulfills certain conditions (such as maintaining minimum stream flow) to
assure the activity meets state water quality standards. 9
B.

CongressionalIntent Behind the Clean Water Act

In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court examined the authority of a state to
require minimum stream flow under the CWA in Elkhorn II In Elkhorn
II, the Public Utility District of Jefferson County (PUD) sought to
construct the Elkhom Hydroelectric Project on the Dosewallips River" in
Washington State. As required by its application for a FERC license, the
PUD sought state § 401 certification that the project met state water
quality standards.4 ' As planned, the Elkhorn project would have diverted
water from a 1.2 mile reach of the Dosewallips River and reduced water
flow in the bypass reach to less than the minimum necessary to protect
salmon and steelhead populations. 42 The State Department of Ecology
(Ecology) issued certification with the condition that the PUD maintain
minimum stream flow in the bypass reach."3 When the Supreme Court of
Washington upheld Ecology's authority to apply such conditions, 4 the
PUD appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 5

36. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1341(a)(1)

(2000). Discharge from a reservoir created under FERC licensing is

not always considered a pollutant. See Sarah C. Richardson, Note, The Changing Political
Landscape of Hydropower Project Relicensing, 25 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 499,
521-24 (2000).

37. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a) & 1344(d) (2000).
38. Id. at § 1341(a)(1).
39. Id. §§ 1341(a), 1341(d).
40. Elkhorn II, 511 U.S. 700, 708-09 (1994).
41. Id. at 709.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. PUD No. I of Jefferson County v. Dep't of Ecology, 121 Wash. 2d 179, 189, 849 P.2d 646,
651 (1993) [hereinafter Elkhom I].
45. Elkhorn A 511 U.S. at 710.
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In Elkhorn II, the Court recognized that Congress intended states to
have considerable authority under § 401 of the CWA and thus held that a
state has power to require an applicant for a federal permit to maintain
minimum water flow in compliance with state law as a condition of
§ 401 certification.46 The Court agreed that a minimum flow requirement
is a valid water quality standard.4 7 Further, the Court held that it was
reasonable for the state to find that reducing stream flow below the level
necessary for sustaining fish populations would violate the state's water
quality policy.4"
The Elkhorn II Court rejected the notion that the CWA exempted
water quantity from water quality standards.49 Writing for the majority, 0
Justice O'Connor observed that the CWA "preserve[s] the authority of
each State to allocate water quantity as between users; [but does] not
limit the scope of water pollution control that may be imposed on users
who have obtained, pursuant to state law, a water allocation."'" The
Court arrived at this conclusion by examining the legislative history
behind the Wallop Amendment52 to the CWA."3 This provision, adopted
in 1977, affirms that each state, not the federal government, has authority
over water allocation.54 The Court determined that although Congress
intended to prevent subversion of state allocation systems, it also
acknowledged that effects on individual rights are permissible if such
effects arise from valid concerns for water quality." Further, the Court
clarified that § 401 certification does not determine the holder's
proprietary interest in the water right, it "merely determines the nature of
the use to which that proprietary right may be put under the [CWA].""

46. Id. at 723.
47. Id. at 719.
48. See id. at 718-19.
49. See id. at 720.
50. Justice Stevens concurred in the result. Id. at 723. Justice Thomas wrote a dissent in which
Justice Scalia joined. Id. at 724.
51. Id. at 720.
52. The amendment is named for Senator Wallop of Wyoming who, along with Senator Hart of
Colorado, introduced it during the 1997 Senate negotiations to amend the CWA. See Gregory J.
Hobbs, Jr. & Bennett W. Raley, Water Rights Protection in Water Quality Law, 60 U. COLO. L. REv.
841, 852-56 (1989).
53. See Elkhorn 11, 511 U.S. at 720.
54. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000).
55. See Elkhorn 11, 511 U.S. at 721.
56. Id.

Water, Property, and the Clean Water Act
In Elkhorn H1, the Court recognized Congress' intent that states
exercise substantial authority under the CWA and thus held that a state
can apply conditions to a project to protect water quality even though
water allocation may be affected.57 After Elkhorn II, commentators
questioned whether a state could condition a project using an existing
water right 8 because the PUD in Elkhorn II did not have an existing right
to divert water.59 Further, the Court was ambiguous as to whether the fact
that a new right was at issue was central to the holding. While the Court
confirmed that a requirement for minimum stream flow does not
correspond to a proprietary water right,6 ° the Court also stated that the
PUD had yet to obtain a water right."
The Supreme Court of Washington resolved the debate for
Washington State in Sullivan Creek.62 The case concerned a
hydroelectric project that had been constructed in 1907, but was
decommissioned in 1956.63 Since that time, the Public Utility District No.
1 of Pend Oreille County (the District) had operated the project under a
FERC nongenerating license.' This allowed the District to release water
from the project's reservoir so that it could flow in the natural streambed
to benefit other hydroelectric projects far downstream. 5 In 1992, the
District proposed to reestablish power generation by diverting water
under the District's existing water right and sending it through a pipeline
to a powerhouse approximately three miles downstream from the
diversion. 6 In the process of amending its FERC license to allow power
generation, the District sought § 401 water quality certification from the
state as required by the CWA.67 Ecology found that the project's
proposed reduction of flow in the bypass reach violated the state's water
quality standards because it endangered fish habitat and diminished a

57. Id.
58. See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 5:91 (2001); Marcia
Newlands, The Elkhorn Case, Environmental Law Practice, 23 WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES
§ 8.92 (Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe, 2000).
59. Elkhorn 11, 511 U.S. at 721.
60. Id. at 720-21.
61. See id. at 721.
62. 146 Wash. 2d 778,784, 51 P.3d 744, 747 (2002).
63. Id. at 784-87, 51 P.3d at 747-49.
64. Id. at 778,51 P.3d at 747.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 784-87, 51 P.3d at 747-49.
67. Id.
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significant recreation and aesthetic resource."8 Ecology issued the
certification with the condition that the District maintain minimum
stream flow in the bypass reach.69 Consequently, the District could not
withdraw the same year-round quantity of water allowed under its
existing water right.70 The Supreme Court of Washington granted a
motion for direct review upon appeal from an administrative hearing
affirming Ecology's
authority to impose the minimum flow
7
requirement. 1
The Sullivan Creek court determined that federal law did not preclude
Ecology from requiring the hydroelectric power project to maintain
minimum stream flow, regardless of the effect on the applicant's existing
water right. 72 Justice Madsen, writing for an eight to one majority, 73 first
declared that under Elkhorn II a state can impose a minimum stream flow
requirement. 74 The court rejected the District's argument that Elkhorn II
did not apply to the facts in Sullivan Creek because, unlike the project in
Sullivan Creek, Elkhorn II concerned a project without an existing water
right.75 The District argued that the Wallop Amendment precluded a state
from imposing a condition that might affect an applicant's existing water
right.76 The court disproved this claim by examining the legislative
history of the Wallop Amendment.7 7 The Supreme Court of Washington
concluded that the Wallop amendment was a legislative compromise to
limit the CWA's jurisdictional reach,78 pointing to Senator Wallop's
remarks that the purpose of the amendment was to assure that the
regulatory authorities used the CWA to protect water quality and not to

68. See id.
69. Id. at 787, 51 P.3d at 748-49.
70. See Petitioner's Opening Brief at 13, Sullivan Creek, 146 Wash. 2d 778, 51 P.3d 744 (2002)
(No. 70272-8).
71. Sullivan Creek, 146 Wash. 2d at 789, 51 P.3d at 749-50. In Sullivan Creek, the Supreme
Court of Washington also ruled on change in point of diversion, water right relinquishment, and
water right abandonment law. Id. at 784, 51 P.3d at 747. This Comment does not address issues
other than a state's authority under the CWA.
72. Id. at 784, 51 P.3d at 747. The court also disagreed that state law prohibited Ecology from
imposing minimum stream flow requirements. Id. at 818, 51 P.3d at 764.
73. Justice Sanders dissented from the majority opinion. Id. at 822, 51 P.3d at 776 (Sanders, J.,
dissenting).
74. Id. at 811, 51 P.3d at761.
75. Id. at812, 51 P.3d at 761.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 813-15, 51 P.3d at 762-63.
78. Id. at 814, 51 P.3d at 762 (citing Hobbs, Jr. & Raley, supra note 52).
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assert federal control over water allocation.79 Based on this history, the
Supreme Court of Washington reasoned that a condition imposed by the
state affecting water quantity but intended to protect water quality was a
legitimate state action under the CWA. 8' Further, the court acknowledged
federal court decisions reasoning that the Wallop amendment does not
immunize a water right holder against legitimate water quality
regulation.8 ' Thus, under Sullivan Creek, Ecology can impose minimum
instream flow requirements in Washington State regardless of whether it
affects an existing water right.
When Congress enacted the CWA, it intended that states be involved
in the effort to control water pollution.82 The CWA assures state
involvement by requiring that an applicant for a federal permit seek
certification from the state that the proposed project meets state water
quality standards.83 In Elkhorn II, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
state's certification authority includes the power to require minimum
stream flow.84 The Supreme Court of Washington held in Sullivan Creek
that the state has this power regardless of whether it affects an existing
water right.85 However, neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Supreme
Court of Washington decided whether this is an unconstitutional taking
of a property right.
II.

FEDERAL TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE AND WATER
RIGHTS

When a state acting under the CWA requires an existing water right
holder to maintain minimum stream flow, the state is potentially
preventing the holder from withdrawing the full quantity of water
allowed by the right.86 This gives rise to the question of whether the
holder is due compensation. 7 Most states recognize a water right as a

79. Id. (citing 123 CONG. REc. 39, 211-12 (1977) (statement of Senator Wallop)).
80. See id. at 814-16, 51 P.3d at 762-63.
81. Id. at 816-17, 51 P.3d at 763-64. The federal cases were Riverside Irrigation District v.
Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985) and United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1986).
82. See supra Part I.A.
83. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2000).
84. Elkhorn II, 511 U.S. 700, 718-19 (1994).
85. Sullivan Creek, 146 Wash. 2d at 784, 51 P.3d at 747.
86. See id. at 787, 51 P.3d at 749.
87. See infra Part II.A.
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constitutionally protected form of property.8 Federal takings
jurisprudence provides guidance on how courts should analyze a water
right takings challenge in the context of state action under the CWA. 9
However, this guidance has limited utility because a water right is a form
of property significantly different from the property considered in federal
takings cases.9" Nonetheless, at least one federal court has applied federal
takings law to a claim involving minimum stream flow and an existing
water right.9'
A.

FederalTakings Jurisprudence

Most states recognize a water right as a form of property deserving
constitutional protection against governmental taking without just
compensation.92 Sovereign governments, such as the United States and
each individual state, possess the power of eminent domain,93 allowing
each to take privately owned property upon payment of compensation.94
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees just
compensation when the government takes private property for public
use.95 Many state constitutions have similar or more protective
provisions. 96 Courts construe the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on
taking to be more than just physical seizure of property.97 For example, a
taking also can occur when a government's regulatory power impairs the
use or value of private property.9 8
The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes three basic situations in which a
governmental taking can occur. The first, known as "physical invasion",

88. Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 121 Wash. 2d 459, 478, 852 P.2d 1044, 1054-55 (1993); see D.
Craig Bell & Norman K. Johnson, State Water Laws and Federal Water Uses: The History of
Conflict, the Prospectsfor Accommodation, 21 ENVTL. L. 1, 5 (1991).
89. See infra Part II.A.
90. See infra Part II.B.
91. See infra Part II.C.
92. See supra note 88.
93. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 11.10 at 468-71 (6th ed.
2000).
94. Id.
95. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
96. Marc. R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the DenominatorProblem, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 663,
664 n.5 (1996).
97. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 93, § 11.12 at 472.
98. Id.
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occurs when the government physically occupies private property.99 The
second, known as "exaction," occurs when the government demands
private property for public use in exchange for the grant of a
development permit.' 0 Finally, the Court has recognized "regulatory
takings" in which the government neither occupies private property nor
exacts it for public uses, but instead regulates the property in a way that
diminishes its value. 101
A physical invasion results in a compensable taking to the extent of
the government's occupation of the property, regardless of whether the
occupation serves the public interest or causes only minor economic
harm to the property owner.'0 2 Thus, a determination of physical invasion
results in a per se taking, affording a very high level of protection to a
property interest. The U.S. Supreme Court enunciated the rule of
physical invasion in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,0 a
where the government compelled property owners to allow cable
television equipment to be installed on their building.' 4 Although the
government was not physically present on the private property, the Court
characterized the government action as occupation' 5 and held that the
owners had suffered a taking of property for which compensation was
due. 106
In contrast, when a government requires a property owner to dedicate
private property for public use in exchange for development approvalsan exaction-the fact that the government action can be characterized as
occupation does not result in an unconstitutional per se taking.'0 7 Instead,
the determination of whether the government has caused a compensable
taking depends on the outcome of two tests. 0 8 The first test asks whether
there is a "nexus" or relationship between the interests a government is
seeking to advance and the condition exacted by the government.'0 9 If
99. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 n.12 (1982) (emphasis
omitted).
100. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999).
101. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465,
1478-79 (2002).
102. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35.
103. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
104. Id. at 438.
105. See id. at 438-39.
106. Id.
107 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 386 (citing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)).
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there is no nexus, then the government has unconstitutionally taken
property." If there is a nexus, the second, "rough proportionality", test
evaluates whether the nature and extent of the exaction is proportionate
to the impact created by the proposed development."' If the dedication of
private property appears to be roughly proportionate to the impact
created by the proposed development, then the government's action is
2
not an unconstitutional taking."
The exaction doctrine recognizes that the government has a legitimate
interest in regulating land use through its development approval
process."' Nonetheless, the doctrine also recognizes that a landowner
should not be forced to give up property without compensation when a
proposed development does not cause the impact the government is
seeking to mitigate."' In Dolan v. City of Tigard,"' the U.S. Supreme
Court considered whether an unconstitutional taking occurred when a
city exacted a portion of a business owner's property for a bicycle trail
when the owner applied for a permit to expand her business." 6 The Court
determined that a nexus existed because there was a relationship between
the city's interest in reducing traffic congestion and the proposed bicycle
trail." 7 However, the city failed to satisfy the rough proportionality test
because it did not show how enlarging the business would generate
additional traffic necessitating the trail." 8 Accordingly, the Court
reversed the Supreme Court of Oregon's decision that the city's act was
valid and remanded the case for further proceedings." 9 Subsequently, the
U.S. Supreme Court suggested that the exaction doctrine's rough
proportionality test might be confined to circumstances where land use
approvals are conditioned on the dedication of private land to public
use. 120

110. Id.
111. Id. at 391.
112. Id. at 395. The Court required no "precise mathematical calculation," only some level of
quantification. Id.
113. Id. at 384-85.
114. Id. at 385.
115. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
116. Id. at 377.
117. Id. at 395.
118. Id.
119. Id.
at 396.
120. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702-03 (1999) (refusing to
extend the rough proportionality test to a circumstance where a city had repeatedly denied a permit).

Water, Property, and the Clean Water Act
The third circumstance in which a property owner may claim a
compensable taking is when the taking is alleged to result from
government regulation. In this circumstance, compensation may be due
depending on whether the regulation deprives the owner of all economic
value, 2' and if not, on a balancing of factors such as the economic
hardship and the character of the government action.'2 2 The regulatory
takings doctrine recognizes government authority to enforce regulations
advancing legitimate state interests such as the protection of health,
24
safety, and general welfare, 2 a and the enhancement of quality of life.
A regulation may substantially diminish the value of a property without
resulting in a compensable taking.' 25 However, if a regulation deprives
the property owner of all economic use of the property, it is a per se
taking requiring compensation.'26
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,'27 the Court considered
whether a state caused a compensable taking when it imposed regulations
limiting development on two seashore properties. 2 8 The Court reasoned
that property owners expect new regulations to restrict property uses, but
eliminating all economically valuable use is inconsistent with the Fifth
Amendment.' The Court reasoned that a total loss of economic value is
constitutional only when background principles of state law present
when the owner took title to the property would have allowed it. 30 The
Court accepted the trial court's finding that newly imposed regulations
rendered the seashore properties valueless' 3 ' and remanded the case to
of nuisance and property law would
determine if background principles
32
result.
same
the
reached
have

121.
122.
123.
124.

See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18 (2001).
See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887).
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City. 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978).

125. See id. at 131 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (75% diminution in

value) and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (87.5% reduction in value)).
126. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
127. Id.at 1003.
128. Id. at 1007.
129. See id. at 1027-28.
130. See id. at 1029 (providing the example of a lakebed owner who would be prohibited from
filling if the effect is to flood the land of others).
131. Id.at 1009.
132. See id. at 1031-32.
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Subsequently, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,133 the Court made clear
that showing that a regulation existed at the time an owner acquires
property does not bar the owner from bringing a takings challenge; a
court must still examine the reasonableness, and thus the
constitutionality, of the regulation.' 34 In Palazzolo, the Court held that a
state prohibition on filling wetlands was not a per se taking because
Palazzolo, a residential landowner, retained some economic value in an
entire parcel.' 35 However, the Court remanded the case for further
consideration, noting that even where a regulation does not result in a
complete taking, a court must analyze government action to determine if
an unconstitutional taking has nonetheless occurred.' 36
The Court recently considered a regulatory takings challenge in
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency. 37 In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court addressed whether a development
moratorium constituted a per se taking. 3 Before deciding that it did
not, 13 1 the Court summarized several aspects of its takings jurisprudence.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, 4 ' characterized a physical
taking as a "rare, easily identified" circumstance in which the
government seizes property for its own use."" In contrast, a regulatory
takings challenge results from a government program intended to benefit
the "common good."' 4 2 The Court emphasized that the property as a
whole must be considered'43 and discouraged isolating discrete rights in
property for purposes of a takings analysis; the "destruction of one
strand" in a "bundle of property rights" does not constitute a taking.' 44 In
addition, the Court confirmed its preference for "ad hoc, factual

133. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
134. Id. at 629-30.
135. Id. at 630.
136. Id. at 632.
137. 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
138. Id. at 1470.
139. Id. at 1486.
140. Six justices joined in the majority. Id. at 1470. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissent in
which Justices Thomas and Scalia joined. Id. Justice Thomas also filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justice Scalia joined. Id.
141. Id. at 1479-80.
142. Id. at 1480.
143. Id. at 1481.
144. Id. (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (internal quotations omitted)).
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inquiries" as opposed to the adoption of per se rules where partial
regulatory takings are at issue.145
In both Tahoe-Sierra'46 and Palazzolo, 47 the Court indicated that
when a regulation does not result in a complete taking, courts should
analyze a takings challenge by balancing a number of factors first
described in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City. 48 In
Penn Central, New York City's landmark preservation ordinance
prevented developers from constructing an office tower above a train
station.'49 The developers claimed that the regulation deprived them of
their property interest in the air space above their building. 5 The Court
held that New York had not effected an unconstitutional taking.' The
Court arrived at this conclusion by balancing (1) the economic impact on
the property owner; (2) the extent of the regulation's interference with
"distinct investment-backed expectation;" and (3) "the character of the
governmental action."' To clarify the last factor, Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, 5 3 noted that an unconstitutional taking "may
more readily be found when the [government's] interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion... than when
interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good."' 54 The Court's
analysis stressed that the government has the authority to employ "laws
or programs that adversely affect recognized economic values" in order
to promote the government's legitimate interest in the public's welfare.'55
Although the Penn Central landowner claimed a multimillion dollar
loss, 15 6 the Court reasoned that the regulation was valid because it

promoted general welfare and gave the landowner reasonable use of the

145. Id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)).
146. See id. at 1481, 1483-84.
147. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18 (2001).
148. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
149. Id. at 115-17.
150. Id. at 130.
151. Id. at 138.
152. Id.
at 124.
153. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Stevens joined. Id. at 106.
154. Id. at 124.
155. Id. at 124-25.
156. Id. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 78:335, 2003

property. 15 7 Thus, the Court held that the preservation ordinance did not
effect a regulatory taking.
B.

The Difficulty of Applying Federal Takings Jurisprudenceto a
Water Right

The primary difficulty in applying federal takings jurisprudence to a
water right is that the right does not fit neatly among the other forms of
property considered by courts in the taking cases. 158 This creates a
challenge because courts find more or less protection depending on the
type of property,'59 the degree of control traditionally exerted over the
property,'60 and whether the government is occupying or regulating the
property.'' The last factor is particularly important because courts afford
the greatest level of protection where the government permanently and
physically occupies property. 6 ' Physical invasion, no matter how little
space is occupied, is per se taking requiring compensation. 163 In contrast,
if the takings challenge arises from government regulation, courts may
not find an unconstitutional taking even though the government action
significantly reduces the value of the property. 164 Commentators
considering takings jurisprudence in the context of water rights usually
assume that courts will apply a regulatory taking analysis; but those who
have suggested a physical invasion analysis admit doubt about its

157. Id. at 138.
158. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Takings and Water Rights, in WATER LAW TRENDS, supra
note 13, at 48; Jan G. Laitos, Water Rights, Clean Water Act Section 404 Permitting, and the
Takings Clause, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 901, 922 (1989); Sax, supra note 14, at 260-61; Marcus J.
Lock, Comment, Braving the Waters of Supreme Court Takings Jurisprudence: Will the Fifth
Amendment Protect Western Water Rights from Federal Environmental Regulation?, 4 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 76, 79 (2000).
159. See JAN G. LATOS, LAW OF PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION, LIMITATIONS ON
GOVERNMENTAL POWERS § 9.03[B], 9-15 (2002 Supp.) (contending that land generally receives the
highest level of protection). But see Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,48-49 (1960) (holding
total destruction of materialmen's liens to be a taking).
160. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992).
161. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1479
(2002).
162. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,427 (1982)).
163. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (describing how the physical invasion in Loretto occupied only 1.5
cubic feet of property). Exactions are an exception to the per se rule when the government occupies
the property. See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 125.
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applicability. 6 ' The correct analysis is unclear given the unique
characteristics of a water right.
First, a water right is a usufructuary right, meaning that the holder
does not own the water but possesses the right to use it.' 66 The water
belongs to the public or to the state.'6 7 The public's ownership of the
water may be subject to appropriation 68 or the state may have a
paramount right to use waters for a public purpose.'69 However, an
appropriation is still subject to the public interest in the water.' 70 For
example, once water is withdrawn from the watercourse and flows in a
private irrigation ditch, it becomes personal property in some states."'
Nonetheless, the right holder can use the water only once and then must
7
return unconsumed portions to the public and other appropriators. 1
Second, a water right is unique because of the extent its entitlements
and duties vary from state to state. The United States has two primary
legal regimes for allocating water rights.'73 The first is riparianism, in
74
which the right to use water attaches to the land next to a watercourse.

165. See Laitos, supra note 158, at 915-22; Douglas L. Grant, Western Water Rights and the
Public Trust Doctrine: Some Realism About The Takings Issue, 27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 423, 437 (1995);
Thompson, supra note 158; James S. Burling, ProtectingPropertyRights in Aquatic Resources Afier
Lucas, in WATER LAW TRENDS, supra note 13, at 56-57 (analyzing taking of a water right without
reference to a physical intrusion analysis); Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Ecological Integrity and Water
Rights Takings in the Post-Lucas Era, in WATER LAW TRENDS, supra note 13, at 74 (analyzing
taking of a water right without reference to a physical intrusion analysis); Sax, supra note 14, at
263--64; Joseph L. Sax,. Rights That 'Inhere in the Title Itself': The Impact of the Lucas Case on
Western Water Law, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 943, 951-54 (1993); Lock, supra note 158, at 99-109;
see also Jan G. Laitos, Water Rights and Water Quality: Recent Developments 23 COLO. LAW 2343,
2346 (assuming a court would apply the Dolan "nexus" and "rough proportionality" analysis to
imposition of water quality conditions under the Clean Water Act).
166. 1 WELLS A. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS INNINETEEN WESTERN STATES 151 (1971).
167. Id. at 5; See Owen L. Anderson et al., Prior Appropriation, in 2 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 12.02, tbl. 12-1 at 12-48-12-55 (2001) (Robert E. Beck ed., 2001).
168. Anderson, supra note 167, at 12-48-12-55. As used here, appropriation is the term for the
claim an individual may legitimately make to withdraw water in order to apply it to a beneficial use.
169. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 202 F.2d 190, 199 (D.C. Cir 1952).
170. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709, 723 (Cal.
1983); Sax, supra note 14, at 269-72; Robert E. Beck, The Legal Regimes, in I WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 4.07, at 4-15 (Robert E. Beck ed., 2001).
171. See I GEORGE VRANESH, COLORADO WATER LAW § 3.1, at 121 (1987).
172. Id.
173. Beck, supra note 170, at 4-1. Many states have adopted permit systems.
174. 78 AM. JUR. 2D Waters § 49 (2002). "Riparian rights" includes such activities as building
wharves and swimming in water. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Introduction to Riparian Rights, in I
WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.01(a), at 6-3-6-4 (Robert E. Beck ed., 2001). This Comment's
reference to riparian rights is limited to consumptive use.
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The second is prior appropriation, which allows for water to be severed
from the land so it can be used at a great distance from the
watercourse.175 The "prior" in prior appropriation comes from the fact
that earlier established rights are "senior" and later established rights are
"junior.' 7 6 In times of drought, junior rights give way to senior rights. 77
Twenty-nine states have riparian systems and all of them are in the
179
78
eastern United States.' Nine states have prior appropriation systems
and the remaining twelve states use hybrid systems. 80
A third distinctive characteristic of a water right is that it is not a
precise amount of water, but a bundle of entitlements and duties. 8 '
Under riparianism, a riparian landowner may divert water for some, but
uses. 182 The riparian landowner's use must be
not all, consumptive
"reasonable;"' 3 meaning that it does not unreasonably interfere with
another riparian landowner's water use. 8 4 In contrast, under prior
appropriation, a water right holder's essential entitlements are the
priority of the right relative to others, and the right to apply water to a
particular "beneficial use."' 85 Beneficial use, rather than water quantity,
86
is "the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to the use of water.'
If an appropriator does not use the entire amount of the water right to
achieve the beneficial use for which the water was appropriated, then the
appropriator must make the excess water available for appropriation by

175. Bell & Johnson, supranote 88, at 6.
176. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 101 (3d ed. 1997).

177. Id.
178. See id. at 5 (Ala., Ark., Conn., Del., Fla., Ga., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Ky., Me., Md., Mass., Mich.,
Minn., Miss., N.H., N.J., N.Y., N.C., Ohio, Pa., R.I., S.C., Tenn., Vt., Va., W. Va., and Wis.).
179. Id. at 7. (Ala., Ariz., Colo., Idaho, Mont., Nev., N.M., Utah, and Wyo.).
180. In hybrid states, state law recognizes both, or parts of both, the prior appropriation and
riparian systems. Id. at 8 (Cal., Kan., Miss., Neb., N.D., Okla., Or., S.D., Tex., Wash.). Louisiana
and Hawaii each have unique systems based on laws established before each state's entry into the
United States. Id.
181. See Dellapenna, supra note 174, at §§ 6-1-6-2; HUTCHINS, supranote 166, at 8-19.
182. See Dellapenna, supra note 174, at § 6.01(a)(4), at 6-49-6-50.
183. Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 133-34 (Ark. 1955); 78 AM. JUR. 2ND Waters § 49
(2002).
184. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water Under "Pure" Riparian Rights, in
I WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.02(d)(2) at 7-47 (2001).
185. Laitos, supra note 158, at 906-07; VRANESH, supra note 171, § 3.1, at 121; HUTCHINS,

supranote 166, at 9.
186. N. M. CONST. art. XVI, § 3; HUTCHINS, supra note 166, at 9; Bell & Johnson, supra note 88,

at 5.
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others.'87 The concept of beneficial use ensures that appropriators use the
public resource to its maximum potential.'8 8 Thus, no one can "waste"
the water. 8 9
Finally, all states exercise a high degree of control over water rights
without implicating a compensable taking. 9 ' For example, all states
control the transfer of a water right to some extent. Some riparian states
allow riparians to convey rights away from riparian lands while others do
not.'19 In contrast, prior appropriation states allow a water right to be sold
separately from land,'92 unless the transfer causes harm to another
right.'93 Further, some states expressly prohibit the transfer of a water
right if it harms the public interest.'9 4 Riparian rights are correlative;
consequently, the amount used by one riparian may shrink or grow
relative to the amounts used by other riparians."' In some
circumstances, 196 a prior appropriation state may reduce the quantity of a
right if it finds that a right holder has not been using the water or has
"wasted" the water.' 97
Thus, a water right is a form of property that is distinctively different
from land or personal property usually considered in federal takings
jurisprudence. 8 The holder does not possess the water, only the right to
use it." A water right is not a precise measure of water but a bundle of
187. See Laitos, supra note 158, at 907-08; VRANESH, supra note 171, § 3.2 at 154; Bell &
Johnson, supra note 88, at 5 (referring to the use-it-or-lose-it principle).
188. See supra note 187.
189. Lock, supra note 158, at 86 (citing A-B Cattle Co. v. United States, 589 P.2d 57, 61 (Colo.
1978)).
190 See Sax, supranote 14, at 260, Barton, supra note 158, at 45-48.
191. Dellapenna, supra note 184, §§ 7.04 at 7-90 & 7.04(a)(3) at 7-97-7-98.

192. Lock, supra note 158, at 82 (citing SAMUEL C. WIEL,

I WATER RIGHTS IN WESTERN STATES

§ 277, at 303-04 (3d ed. 1911)).
193. VRANESH, supra note 171, § 3.1 at 122; Owen L. Anderson et al., Reallocation, Transfers,
and Changes, in 2 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, § 14.04(c), at 14-40-14-42 (Robert E. Beck ed.,
1991).
194. See Bell & Johnson, supra note 88, at 6-11; Douglas L. Grant, Public Interest Review of
Water Right Allocation and Transfer in the West: Recognition of Public Values, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
681, 681-82, (1987); Anderson, supra note 193, § 14.04(d)(1) at 14-60-14-61.
195. Dellapenna, supra note 182, at § 6.01(a)(4)-6-50.
196. An example of such a circumstance is an adjudication, "a special form of quiet title action to
determine all existing rights to the use of water from a specific body of water." Dep't of Ecology v.
Grimes, 121 Wash. 2d 459, 466, 852 P.2d 1044, 1048 (1993).
197. See id. at 471-72.
198. See Thompson, supra note 158, at 48; Laitos, supranote 158, at 922; Sax, supra note 14, at
260-61; Lock, supra note 158, at 79 (2000).
199. See HUTCHINS, supra note 166.
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entitlements and duties,2 °° which varies greatly from state to state.20 ' In
many circumstances, the state can affect a water right without violating
the Fifth Amendment prohibition on taking without compensation. 2 2 The
characteristics of the property interest in a water right make application
of federal takings jurisprudence difficult in water rights cases.
C.

JudicialApplication of Takings Jurisprudencein the Context of
Minimum Stream Flow and Water Rights

At least one court has found a physical taking in a matter concerning
minimum stream flow and water rights. In Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District v. United States,20 3 the United States Court of Federal
Claims found a physical invasion 0 4 when the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation (BOR) withheld a portion of water that it had contracted to
supply to water service districts. 20 5 The BOR had not delivered the entire
amount because low instream water volumes threatened endangered fish
species.20 6 Although the court did not question the State of California's
authority to alter the water rights at issue,20 7 it concluded that the federal
government could not justify its refusal to deliver the entire amount
because the state had not reduced the quantity allowed under the water
rights.20 ' Reasoning that the BOR had displaced the contract holder, the
court characterized the government's action as a physical intrusion.2 9
The Court of Federal Claims based its finding that a physical invasion
analysis is appropriate to apply to a water right on three cases.210 First,
the court compared the case to United States v. Causby21 where the U.S.
Supreme Court found a compensable taking had occurred when low
flying military planes occupied the air space above a chicken farm,
depriving the private property owners of the use and enjoyment of their
200. See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
202. See supranotes 191-97 and accompanying text.
203. 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001).
204. Id. at 318-19.
205. Id. at 316.
206. Id. at 315.
207. Id. at 324.
208. Id. The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) was acting in response to the Endangered
Species Act. Id. at 315.
209. Id. at 319.
210. Id.
211. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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land.2" 2 The court in Tulare Lake Basin found that the BOR's act of
withholding water mirrored Causby's circumstances because the BOR
had eliminated the water districts' use and enjoyment of the amount of
water withheld in order to preserve endangered fish.2" 3
Further, the Court of Federal Claims analogized the facts of Tulare
Lake Basin to InternationalPaper Co. v. United States,2"' a case where
the government requisitioned all the power a New York power company
could generate during World War I.215 To increase the power company's
capacity, the government directed the power company to use all the
water from its power canal, thus cutting off water the power company
leased to International Paper." 6 The U.S. Supreme Court held that this
was a governmental taking of the amount of leased water. 217 The Court
recognized that the property taken was International Paper's "right... to
the use of water. 2 8 The Tulare Lake Basin court viewed this as a
confirmation of its characterization of a water right as property subject to
219
a physical invasion analysis.
The third case, Dugan v. Rank,220 was a complex injunction suit filed
in 1947 to prevent construction of the Friant Dam.22' Prior to building the
dam, the property owners refused to sell their rights to the government.222
Once built, the dam impounded water that would have been delivered to
the landowners but went instead to Central Valley irrigation districts.223
The district court held that Congress had not authorized the federal
government to seize water rights, but to acquire such rights exclusively
through judicial proceedings.224 The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that the government had the power to "to acquire the water rights
of respondents by physical seizure. ''225 However, the Court emphasized

212. Id. at 266.
213. TulareLake Basin, 49 Fed. CI. at 319.
214. 282 U.S. 399 (1931).
215. Id. at 405.
216. Id. at 405-06.
217. Id. at408.
218. Id.at 407.
219. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. C1. 313, 319 (2001).
220. 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
221. Id. at 610.
222. Id. at 613-14.
223. Id. at 612-13.
224. See id. at616.
225. Id. at 619.
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that the government intended to purchase the water rights22 6 and
ultimately held that the property owners were due damages resulting
from the otherwise valid seizure of water rights.227
The Tulare Lake Basin court found three factors in Dugan to support
an application of a physical invasion takings analysis to water rights.
First, in Dugan, the U.S. Supreme Court referred to the method the
government used to acquire water rights as "physical seizure. 228 Second,
when the Court clarified that a physical invasion of land was not
necessary to claim a taking, the Court observed that a seizure of a water
right can be "analogized to interference or partial taking of air space over
land., 229 Finally, the Court held that the government effected a
compensable taking when it seized water rights rather than compensating
the deprived landowners. 230 Thus, the Tulare Lake Basin court held that a
physical invasion analysis is the appropriate test in a water rights takings
challenge.
A question of unconstitutional takings arises when state action
restrains a water right holder from withdrawing the entire quantity
allowed under a right.23' Federal takings tests for physical intrusion,
exaction or regulatory taking can inform a court considering a takings
challenge under the CWA. 232 Determining which test is appropriate in a
water rights case is complicated by the fact that a water right is a form of
property distinctly different from the exclusively owned private property
usually considered in takings jurisprudence. 233 However, one federal
court has applied physical intrusion analysis to a claim resulting from the
234
effect of a minimum stream flow requirement on existing water rights.

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 623.
See id. at 624.
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319 (2001).
Id. (citing Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 625 (1963)).
Id.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part ll.B.
See supra Part II.C.
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I.

COURTS SHOULD ANALYZE A TAKINGS CHALLENGE TO
STATE ACTION IMPOSING MINIMUM FLOW
REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT AS A
REGULATORY TAKING

Courts recognize that a water right is property protected against
unconstitutional governmental taking.235 A state action under the CWA
that prevents a water right holder from withdrawing the full measure of a
water right gives rise to a takings challenge.236 Courts should not analyze
this state action under the physical intrusion analysis because the state is
not seizing the water right and the complex nature of a water right is not
suited to an inflexible, per se analysis.237 Further, a court should not
analyze the takings challenge as an exaction because the analysis is
inconsistent with the nature of the government action and, more
importantly, it could yield an unfair result.23 Instead, a court should use
the regulatory takings analysis because it is appropriate to the nature of a
water right, consistent with the type of government action, and most
likely to reach a fair conclusion. 9
A.

The PhysicalInvasion Analysis is Inappropriateto a Water Rights
Takings Challenge Under the Clean Water Act

A court should not analyze a water right taking challenge under the
CWA as a physical invasion. Despite the finding of the Court of Federal
Claims in Tulare Lake Basin,240 a water right is not a suitable subject for
an analysis in which the slightest diminution results in a per se
compensable taking. The physical invasion analysis is inappropriate
because it is inconsistent with both the legal nature of a water right and
the character of the state action. 24' Further, the cases on which the Tulare
Lake Basin court bases its conclusion do not apply when a state imposes
minimum flow requirements under the CWA.242

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part III.C.
49 Fed. C1. 313 (2001).
See infra Part III.A.I.
See infra Part III.A.2.
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A PhysicalInvasion Analysis is Contrary to the Nature of a Water
Right and the Characterof the State Action

The Tulare Lake Basin court's finding that a physical invasion
analysis is appropriate to a water right24 3 contravenes the legal nature of a
water right in three ways. First, the water right holder does not have
exclusive interest in the water. 2" Water in a natural watercourse is the
property of the public or the state.245 Even after water is diverted, it is
subject to the interests of others in both riparian 46 and prior
appropriation 247 systems. In any system, a water right holder does not
own the water; but possesses only the right to use it. 245 The quantity
diverted by a riparian landowner may be reduced if the diversion
unreasonably prevents fellow riparian landowners from asserting their
rights.249 In prior appropriation states, a water right holder is obligated to
use water efficiently, 250 apply it only once to the beneficial use for which
it was granted, and then return the unused portions to the public. 251 The
shared interests inherent in a water right make it a substantially different
type of property from the land in Lucas,252 the specified amount of water
253 and the
agreed to by private parties in InternationalPaper,
contracted
amount of water in Tulare Lake Basin.254
Second, unlike ownership in land, the entitlements attaching to a water
right vary significantly from state to state. 255 A takings rule adopted in
one state may not be correct under another state's law. This supports the

243. TulareLake Basin, 49 Fed. CI. at 319.
244. See supra Part II.B.
245. See HU'rCHINS,supra note 166, at 5-6; Anderson, supra note 167, at 12-48-12-55.
246. See Dellapenna, supra note 174, at 6-49-6-50; Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 133-34
(Ark. 1955); 78 AM. JUR. 2ND Waters § 49 (2002); Dellapenna, supra note 184, at 7-47.
247. See VRANESH, supra note 171 § 3.1, at 121; GETCHES, supra note 176, at 101; Laitos, supra
note 158, at 907-08; VRANESH, supra note 171 § 3.2, at 154; Bell & Johnson, supra note 88, at 5;
Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 121 Wash. 2d 459,466, 852 P.2d 1044, 1048 (1993).
248. See HUTCHINS, supra note 166, at 151.
249. Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 133-34 (Ark. 1955); 78 AM. JUR. 2D Waters § 49 (2002);
Dellapenna, supranote 184, at 7-47.
250. Lock, supranote 158, at 86; Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 121 Wash. 2d 459, 471-72, 852
P.2d 1044, 1054-55 (1993).
251. VRANESH,supra note 171, at 121.
252 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006 (1992).
253 Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 405 (1931).
254. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314 (2001).
255. See Beck, supranote 170, at 4-1; 78 AM. JUR. 2D Waters § 49 (2002); Bell & Johnson, supra
note 88, at 6; GETCHES, supra note 176, at 5-8.
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conclusion that an inflexible, per se taking rule is inappropriate to a
water right. Further, avoiding a per se rule is consistent with the U.S.
Supreme Court's opinion in Tahoe-Sierra which expressed a preference
for "ad hoc, factual inquiries" rather than per se rules." 6
Third, a water right is not a right to a certain quantity of water alone; it
is a collection of entitlements and duties. 5 7 In riparian states, water rights
are correlative; the quantity diverted by a riparian landowner can be
reduced if the use unreasonably infringes on the rights of other riparian
landowners to divert water."5 In prior appropriation states, the
fundamental entitlements of a water right are (1) the right to priority of
use relative to others and (2) the right to apply water to a beneficial use,
which is limited by the maximum quantity of water that may be diverted
under the right.259 If a right holder can accomplish the same beneficial
use with less water than the maximum amount allowed by a right, then
the excess water must be made available for other uses.260 In other
words, in either system, a water right is not altered in its entirety by a
lesser quantity of water. As the Court reiterated in Tahoe-Sierra,
affecting one stick in a bundle of rights does not constitute a per se
taking.26' Thus, the government does not cause a per se compensable
taking when a water quality regulation prevents diversion of the full
amount of a water right.262
2.

The Tulare Lake Basin Court Incorrectly Applied Precedent

Further, the three cases on which Tulare Lake Basin is based are
distinguishable from circumstances where a government, acting in its
regulatory capacity, imposes minimum flow requirements on the use of

256. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1481
(2002) (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015).
257. See Dellapenna, supra note 174, at 6-1-6-2; HUTCHINS, supra note 166, at 8-19.
258. Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 133-34 (Ark. 1955); 78 AM. JUR. 2D Waters § 49 (2002);
Dellapenna, supra note 184, at 7-47.

259. Laitos, supra note 158, at 906-07.
260. See id. at 907-08; VRANESH, supranote 171, § 3.2 at 154; Bell & Johnson, supra note 88.
261. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1481
(2002).

262. A state legislature could redefine a water right as a purely quantified amount without the
elements of beneficial or reasonable use, but would risk increasing a state's potential liability in
managing water. States could incur substantial costs if every holder could claim a per se taking
whenever water is inadvertently withheld or unavailable for reasons other than those expressly stated
in the law.
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an existing water right. In the first case, United States v. Causby,263 the
Court found a compensable taking when military planes occupied a
portion of private property-the air space above the land-and by doing
so deprived the owners of the use and enjoyment of their land.264
However, government action affecting air space is not a per se physical
intrusion; courts can analyze the effect of government action on air space
as a regulatory taking. 265
In contrast to Causby, the government is not occupying a portion of a
water holder's property when it imposes minimum flow requirements; it
is merely regulating how the holder may use the property.266 The full
measure of the right remains available to the holder to use in a manner
that does not create the condition that the government is seeking to
mitigate by imposing the minimum flow requirement. 267 For example, a
holder could redesign a project to reduce the length of the bypass reach
and thereby eliminate water quality concerns. Also, unlike the airplanes
in Causby that affected a portion of the property beyond that actually
occupied by the airplanes, 268 minimum flow requirements does not
deprive a right holder of the use and enjoyment of the entirety of a water
right. The quantity allowed under a water right is only one stick in the
bundle of entitlements inhering in the right. 269 Therefore, a physical
intrusion analysis would be inconsistent with Tahoe-Sierra, where the
Court emphasized that the government does not create a per se taking
when it affects one stick in a bundle of rights.270
Further, the Tulare Lake Basin court's reliance on InternationalPaper
is misplaced.27' InternationalPaper concerned not water rights, but a
contract between private parties that created a right to a certain amount
of leased water.272 State water law, not a contract, creates a holder's
property interest in a water right.273 Under state law, the maximum
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

328 U.S. 256 (1946).
Id. at 266.
See id.
Elkhorn II, 511 U.S. 700, 721 (1994).
See id.
See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946).
See Dellapenna, supra note 174, at 6-1-6-2; HUTCHINS, supranote 166, at 8-19.
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1481

(2002).

271. TulareLake Basin, 49 Fed. Cl. at 319.
272. Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 405 (1931).
273. See Beck, supranote 170, at 4-1; 78 AM. JUR. 2D Waters § 49 (2002); Bell & Johnson, supra
note 88, at 6; GETCHES, supra note 176, at 5-8.
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amount of water that a holder may divert under the right is but one
element in that bundle of rights and duties." 4 Further, state law allows
for considerable control over a water right without resulting in a
compensable taking.275
Finally, the Tulare Lake Basin court misunderstood the U.S. Supreme
Court's language in Dugan. The Tulare Lake Basin court correctly
observed that the Dugan Court referred to the taking of water rights as a
physical seizure, comparing it to interference with air space.276 However,
the Court used the term "physical seizure" to describe taking a right
without consent as compared to acquiring the right through an eminent
domain proceeding. 7 The Court used the air space analogy to explain
that a physical invasion of land is not necessary for a taking to have
occurred.27 It did not use the air space analogy to hold that government
action affecting a water right is a per se taking. Further, the key issue in
Dugan was that the Central Valley project took water from water rights
claimants and gave equivalent rights to others.279 In contrast, when a state
exercises its § 401 certification authority to impose minimum flow
requirements, it is not taking one right and giving it to another. The state
is simply conditioning the way in which a holder may use the water
right.280 As described in Tahoe-Sierra, this is not a physical taking, but
an effect on a property right arising from a program intended to benefit
" '
the common good.28
The court in Tulare Lake Basin incorrectly concluded that a water
right takings challenge should be analyzed under the physical invasion
analysis. An analysis in which the slightest diminution results in a per se
compensable taking contravenes the nature of a water right and the
government action. 82 Further, the cases on which the Tulare Lake Basin
where a state imposes
court relied are distinguishable from a situation
minimum flow requirements under the CWA.283
274. See Dellapenna, supra note 174, at 6-1-6-2; HUTCHINS, supra note 166, at 8-19.
275. See Sax, supra note 14, at 260; Barton, supra note 158, at 45-48.
276. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319 (2001) (citing
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 625 (1950)).
277. Dugan, 372 U.S. at 619.
278. Id. at 625.
279. See id. at 612-13.
280. Elkhorn 11,511 U.S. 700, 721 (1994).
281. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'] Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465,
1479-80 (2002).
282. See supra Part I.A. 1.
283. See supra Part 1II.A.2.
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An Exaction Analysis is Inappropriateto a Water Rights Takings
Challenge

Imposing minimum flow requirements under § 401 resembles an
exaction because it permits a water rights holder to build a project, but
only if the holder agrees to divert less than the maximum amount of
water allowable under an existing water right. However, an exaction
analysis is inappropriate to a water rights takings challenge because it is
not consistent with the regulatory character of the government action and
is potentially unfair to the water right holder.
A water rights takings challenge under the CWA is not the same as a
land takings challenge in Dolan,2 where the city required a business
owner who wanted to build a bigger store to hand over privately-held
land for a public bicycle trail.2" 5 In Dolan, the government would have
physically occupied the property."' In contrast, a water right holder
retains the property that is purportedly the subject of the exaction.
Further, the holder may use the full measure of the right provided that the
use does not result in poor water quality that the government intended the
minimum flow requirement to avoid.287 Therefore, the government is not
occupying, but merely regulating the property.
Second, the exaction analysis is potentially unfair to a water right
holder because the doctrine does not allow balancing the interests of the
state with the reasonable expectations of the right holder.2"' If the
exaction analysis is applicable to a water right challenge, then the state is
likely to justify imposing minimum flow requirements under its § 401
authority in nearly all circumstances. There is a clear nexus between (1)
the exaction (minimum water flow) and (2) the harm created by the
proposed project (too little water). If the amount of water not diverted
equals the amount of water necessary to meet water quality standards,
then the exaction is roughly proportional to the harm. But, the court does
not consider the extent of the holder's loss unless the holder loses all
economic value in use of the right.2" 9 This is potentially unfair because

284. 512 U.S. 374, 377 (1994).
285. Id. at 378.
286. Id. at 380.
287. See Elkhom 1, 511 U.S. 700, 721 (1994).
288. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386-96 (defining the exaction analysis tests without reference to the
economic expectations of the landowner).
289. If a minimum flow requirement extinguishes all economically viable use of the right, it is a
per se taking. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
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the holder may have reasonably expected to use the full measure of the
water right granted under state law and may have invested funds in
seeking to use the right. The exactions analysis is not suited to a water
rights taking challenge because it considers neither the extent of the harm
to the holder, the reasonableness of the holder's expectation or the
legitimacy of the state action.29 °
C.

A Water Right Takings Challenge is Best Analyzed as a Regulatory
Taking

One disadvantage of the regulatory takings analysis is that, compared
to exaction analysis, the outcome of judicial scrutiny is less
predictable.29' Under an exaction analysis, a state's action will be valid as
long as the state can demonstrate its minimum flow requirement is
tailored to meet the water quality standard. 92 Under the regulatory
takings analysis, however, the state's action may solve a water quality
problem but still be an unconstitutional taking if it has a substantial
economic impact on a water right holder.293 At the same time, the court
could also find that a taking has not occurred if the protection afforded to
the public by the requirement outweighs the impact suffered by the
holder.294 Despite the lesser degree of predictability, a regulatory takings
analysis is more likely than other takings tests to reach a fair result in a
water right takings challenge.
Under a regulatory takings analysis, if a government's regulatory
action does not deprive a water right holder of all economic value,295 the
court balances factors such as the economic hardship and the character of
the government action to determine if an unconstitutional taking has
occurred.296 Regulatory takings analysis is the most appropriate test for a
court to use when considering a challenge to state imposed minimum
flow requirements under CWA for three reasons. First, the regulatory
290. Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., has,
without explanation, intimated that the exaction doctrine's rough proportionality test is appropriate
only to land use decisions. 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999).
291. The following assumes the requirement does not destroy all economically viable use of the
right. If it does, it is a per se taking. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
292. See supraPart III.B.
293. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
294. Id.
295. If a minimum flow requirement extinguishes all economically viable use of the right, it is a
per se taking. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
296. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 138.
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takings analysis accounts for and balances the many interests that
permeate a water right.297 Second, a regulatory takings analysis is in
harmony with the legal nature of a water right.298 Finally, the test
acknowledges that299
the state is acting in its regulatory capacity under state
law and the CWA.
A regulatory takings analysis is more likely to be fair because it
requires the court to consider all of the interests inherent in the right. The
test protects the right holder by requiring the court to examine the
economic impact on the water right holder and the extent to which the
minimum flow regulations interferes with the holder's reasonable
investment-backed expectations. 300 The test protects the public by
recognizing the government's authority to enforce laws and programs
promoting the public welfare, even though the economic value of private
property may be adversely affected.30 ' This balancing of interests makes
the regulatory takings analysis more appropriate to a water right takings
challenge than other takings analyses employed by the courts.
Second, a regulatory takings analysis accords with the legal nature of
a water right. The factors that cause a water right to be unsuitable for a
physical invasion analysis30 2 render it appropriate for a regulatory takings
analysis. A water right is a collection of entitlements and duties, not a
right to a precise quantity of water.30 3 The entitlements and duties vary
greatly from state to state.3°4 There are circumstances in which a state can
adjust a water right without leading to a compensable taking. 3 5 The
unique legal character of a water right, and the degree of control that
states exercise over it, make it appropriate to a regulatory takings
analysis because the test compels the court to balance several factors on a
factual, case-by-case basis. This is consistent with the U.S. Supreme
Court's acknowledgement in Lucas that the degree of control that states
traditionally exercise over the property affects the outcome of a takings

297. Id. at 124.
298. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1481 (2002).
299. See Elkhorn 11,511 U.S. 700, 721 (1994).
300. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
301. Id.
302. See supra Part III.A.
303. See Dellapenna, supra note 174, at 6-1-6-2; HUTCHINS, supranote 166, at 8-19.
304. See Beck, supranote 170, at 4-1; Getches, supra note 176, at 5-8.
305. See Dellapenna, supra note 174, at § 6.01(a)(4)-6-50; Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 121
Wash. 2d 459, 466, 852 P.2d 1044, 1048 (1993).
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analysis.3" 6 It also reflects the Court's emphasis in Tahoe-Sierra that a
takings analysis must consider the property as a whole.3" 7
Finally, a regulatory analysis is appropriate to apply to a water rights
taking challenge because the government is acting in its regulatory
capacity. When a state imposes minimum flow requirements, it does not
affect the water right holder's proprietary interest in the water.30 8 Instead,
it is regulating how the holder may use the water." 9 The holder may use
the full allowable quantity of the right if the use does not cause the
condition that the government intended the minimum flow requirement
to mitigate.3" 0
When a state imposes a minimum flow requirement under its § 401
certification authority, a water right holder may challenge the state's
action as an unconstitutional taking of property.3 ' A government has
effected a per se taking if the water right holder retains no economically
viable use of the property.3 2 If the water right remains useful, the court
should not analyze the challenge as either a physical intrusion 31 3 or as an
exaction,3" 4 but as a regulatory taking because this analysis will be more
likely to accurately consider the interests intrinsic to the right. 3 5 Further,
the analysis respects the legal nature of a water right, and reflects the fact
31 6
that the state is acting in its regulatory capacity.
IV. CONCLUSION
States have the power to impose minimum flow requirements under
the CWA and thereby affect an existing water right. If a water right
holder cannot withdraw the full quantity of his or her right because of the
minimum flow requirements and is not compensated by the state, then
the holder can challenge the state action as an unconstitutional taking. A
court should not examine this challenge under the physical intrusion
306.
307.
(2002).
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
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analysis because the state is not physically intruding on the property and
an inflexible, per se test is not appropriate to the legal nature of a water
right. Similarly, a court should not analyze the takings challenge as an
exaction because the state is not occupying the water right but merely
regulating how it can be used, and an exaction analysis could conclude in
an unfair result. Thus, a court should analyze this challenge against the
state as a regulatory taking because the state is acting in its regulatory
capacity, the analysis respects the legal nature of a water right, and the
result will accurately consider the diverse interests inherent in a water
right.

